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Strategy, referred to by many as the "Bush Doctrine," will have a significant impact on the military role in power projection. Implementing guidance and operational concepts regarding the impact of military power projection on information operations, theater security cooperation activities, military transformation and Joint Presence Policy must be addressed now in order to ensure the transition from a containment strategy to a strategy of pre-emption is successful. 
BACKGROUND
Power projection is the ability of the United States to apply all the necessary elements of national power (military, economic, diplomatic, and informational) at the place and time necessary to achieve national security objectives. 2 An effective and demonstrated power projection capability can promote security and deter the aggression of potential adversaries, demonstrate resolve, and if necessary, enable successful military operations anywhere in the world.
The National Security Strategy (NSS), published in September 2002, states that the primary security objective is to protect the United States and its allies from rogue states and their terrorist clients before they are able to threaten or use weapons of mass destruction. 3 The response to national security threats must take full advantage of strengthened alliances, the establishment of new partnerships with former adversaries, innovation in the use of military forces, modern technologies (including the development of an effective missile defense system) and increased emphasis on intelligence collection and analysis.
4
The National Military Strategy (NMS) further outlines the objectives, operational concepts and resources required for successful implementation of the NSS. The NMS objectives include:
defend the United States Homeland, promote security and deter aggression, win the Nation's wars, and ensure military superiority. 5 To achieve these objectives, the strategy calls for the execution of multiple, simultaneous and synchronized military operational concepts. These concepts are designed to protect the U.S. Homeland and interest abroad, prevent conflict and unwarned attacks, and prevail against adversaries in a wide range of possible contingencies, today and tomorrow.
6
Protecting the United States is a demanding mission in the homeland and overseas.
Protection includes the military's "total force" mission of homeland security which includes the protection planning required for unanticipated contingencies and the use of all military assets, conventional as well as ARSOF. Homeland security is an interagency, interdepartmental mission which includes many activities associated with the "total force," and includes the Army and Air Force National Guard and reserve military forces. The NMS further states that overseas protection is the first line-of-defense, with trained and ready joint forces capable of deterring adversaries, responding to aggression, and countering coercion.
7
The NMS states that prevention requires the presence of forces and capabilities in key regions--as outlined in the combatant commanders theater security cooperation plans--to signal U.S. commitment and provide the means to enhance stability and security, deter aggression, defend national interests, and reduce the probability of conflict.
8 First line-of-defense forces, as well as forces war-traced for contingency operations and war plans, are identified in the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP). In order to successfully achieve the objectives and operational concepts identified in the NMS -in particular prevailing against adversaries in a wide range of possible contingencies -the NMS states that military power will be projected and employed from dispersed locations to overwhelm any adversary and control any situation, while maintaining the flexibility to rapidly conduct and sustain multiple, simultaneous missions in geographically separated and environmentally diverse regions of the world. Two of seven Special Forces Groups are found in the Army National Guard, and the overwhelming majority of Civil Affairs forces reside in the Army reserves.
An ARSOF task force, consisting of a Special Forces battalion, company level special operations aviation and support units, a Ranger platoon, and detachment level Civil Affairs and
Psychological Operations, will significantly increase the capability and flexibility of all U.S.
forward-stationed and deployed forces. The ARSOF task force has an inherent ability to organize, train, equip, mold and lead coalition, indigenous, and surrogate groups into a capable, competent, and viable force. The ARSOF task force is capable of not only force projection, but is also useful in the social-work and policing dimensions embedded in forward presence.
The ARSOF task force, forward deployed and continuously engaged with joint and combined forces, would deploy for not more than 180 days and support two task force deployments per year in each combatant commander's area of responsibility. ARSOF must be force structured to provide forces deployed, forces preparing to deploy, transitional forces and forces being maintained. The continuous deployment of a select, JSCP apportioned ARSOF task force will assist in establishing steady-state force levels in critical regions around the world, 
THE TRANSFORMED BATTLEFIELD: AN ARSOF OBJECTIVE FORCE CONCEPT
In order to execute the ambitious pre-emptive strategy and defeat threats before they fully materialize as required by the NSS and NMS, all elements of national power must be continuously engaged. Continuous engagement requires that threats, operational concepts and long-term strategic goals be identified early and cooperation strategies be developed, approved and resourced prior to execution. The NSS must clearly state the threats to the Nation and identify the near and far-term security concerns and national objectives. 19 The result is information superiority.
ARSOF possesses the unique ability to work in, among and through the local populace to enhance both information and intelligence gathered from those indigenous contacts based on numerous deployments to their countries. 20 Information operations provide the combatant commander with a better understanding of the battlespace and make it increasingly difficult for the enemy to achieve an equivalent understanding, thus reducing the speed and effectiveness of the enemy's decision-making ability and thereby reducing the need to commit conventional forces. 21 The continuous deployment and engagement of an ARSOF task force provides the combatant commander with invaluable knowledge (continuously updated as an element of routine assessment studies) of the capabilities of the regional infrastructure, including ports, airfields, road networks, medical facilities, logistical sustainment systems, fuel distribution and manufacturing systems, communications and control centers and other areas of interest.
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When a crisis occurs, the ARSOF Task Force can quickly provide "ground truth" to assist in courses of action development by the combatant commander.
The predominant challenge to executing the pre-emptive NSS and NMS may fall within the public affairs area of information operations. An example of the challenges ahead might be found in the following analysis of the "Bush Doctrine" published in the Los Angeles Times.
William Pfaff, writing for the Los Angeles Times, says that the "Bush Doctrine" is "an implicit
American denunciation of the modern state order that has governed international relations since the Westphalian Settlement of 1648." 23 The Westphalian Settlement recognized the sovereignty and legal equality of states as the foundation of international order. Mr. Pfaff fears that the NSS subordinates the security of every other nation to that of the U.S., and if the U.S. unilaterally determines that a state is a threat or harbors a terrorist threat, the U.S. will preemptively intervene to eliminate the threat (if necessary) by accomplishing a "regime change." 24 The first challenge of the new NSS and NMS might very well involve public affairs, and the impact on information operations, of the pre-emptive policy and the military role in force projection.
ARSOF must be "transformational" in keeping the public informed of trends, policies and activities regarding theater security cooperation plans, transformation, and Joint Presence Policy. In order to keep the citizenry informed, the ARSOF task force must integrate all methods of getting the media engaged early, so that the military story is the first one released in the case of pre-emptive strikes and force projection. A public affairs capability must be integrated into the ARSOF task force to enhance information superiority.
Adversaries will take advantage of the power of public information to affect both domestic and foreign perceptions and attempt to undermine the political will and international influence of the United States. 25 The ARSOF Task Force, continuously deployed in support of each combatant commander, is the first military force projected that is fully capable of gaining information superiority and possibly eliminating the need to employ additional forces into a combat situation. Theater security cooperation, transformation and joint presence policy are mutually inclusive of the operational benefits gained through effective information operations.
THEATER SECURITY COOPERATION
Theater security cooperation activities contribute to, and benefit from, effective information operations. ARSOF habitually contributes to theater security cooperation activities which improve interoperability with allies and coalition partners and provide opportunities for the 
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ARSOF routinely uses these overseas facilities to project force and conduct information operations and theater security cooperation activities.
Theater security cooperation activities and operations of Special Forces with supporting
Civil Affairs, Psychological Operations, and, as required, conventional forces, presents a politically viable and relatively low-cost means to maintain U.S. forward presence. The small footprint of many theater security cooperation activities reduces the political liability to host governments and the United States. 30 Theater security cooperation plans may include small unconventional footprints in countries not necessarily receptive to U.S. objectives, and the costs of these small numbers of forward-deployed forces are lower (both economically and politically) and more responsive to political and resource constraints than those of large conventional forward-stationed forces.
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TRANSFORMATION
Military transformation is a sustained, iterative, and dynamic process that integrates new concepts, processes, technologies, and organizational redesign and seeks to ensure a substantive margin of advantage over potential adversaries while minimizing the chances and consequences of surprise. 32 The transformation of military forces will, and should, impact each service and every combatant commander. The military transformation from a threat oriented, requirements-based force to a capabilities-based force with overwhelming force projection capabilities (as required by the NMS) must be constant, rapidly executed, and transparent to the challenges of current worldwide contingency operations. In order to project the force, promote security and deter aggression, the U.S. military must explore new and faster ways to employ existing capabilities; more rapidly integrate select new technologies in fielded forces, and undertake organizational changes that increase the flexibility, utility, and effectiveness of the military.
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The QDR recommends that the U.S. reshape its military forces to be more deployable, sustainable, and flexible, and in the case of the European theater, less oriented toward heavy combat operations. 34 Eliminating combat-heavy forces would be extremely unwise, but exchanging some portion of the existing heavy brigades for new, medium-weight units would greatly enhance the military's ability to promote security and deter aggression effectively in all operational theaters. 35 However, the QDR warns that finding creative strategies to remain sufficiently interoperable with allies while avoiding dumbing down the transformation process will be one of the more challenging tasks facing the United States in the future. 36 The ARSOF task force, forward deployed and continuously engaged, provides a deployable, sustainable, and flexible force capable of enhancing interoperability and promoting transformation through exercises and experiments with joint and combined forces. A truly effective Joint Presence Policy will be transformational in identifying ARSOF requirements, justifying the right force structure, and determining the appropriate level of engagement required to meet force projection requirements. Like the Navy's GNFPP, ARSOF must be force structured to consider forces deployed, forces preparing to deploy, transitional forces and forces being maintained. Expansion or reduction of ARSOF force structure will be determined by the requirements of the combatant commander and the Joint Presence Policy. Politics when he wrote, "The short limited wars and rescue operations with which we shall be engaged will go unsanctioned by Congress and the citizenry; so, too, will pre-emptive strikes against the computer networks of our adversaries and other defense-related measures that in many instances will be kept secret. Collaboration between the Pentagon and corporate America is necessary, and will grow. Going to war will be less and less a democratic decision." 48 The ARSOF task force must be innovative executing information operations that address the concerns of all Americans regarding force projection.
CONCLUSION
These recommendations provide mission focus, operational efficiency and relevancy to the many missions that ARSOF currently conduct in support of regional combatant commanders. ARSOF force projection deployments in support of the Joint Presence Policy provide a model for determining future conventional force requirements while immediately meeting steady-state levels of air, land, and naval presence in critical regions around the world.
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